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for both the Kidd and Crowley properties did not contain an express
grant of riparian rights and, therefore, the Kidds and Crowleys had no
legal right to claim riparian rights to their properties.
With respect to the mean water line claim, the supreme court
recognized the Kennedy survey used a mean water line designated in
1908, when the parties' properties were originally platted ("Historic
MWL"). The Carrs claimed the correct measure to determine riparian
rights was the current mean water line ("Current MLW"). The
supreme court stated the general law governing the measurement and
allocation of riparian rights is that any man-made improvements to a
riparian owner's shoreline that alter the location of the shoreline
should be disregarded in a determination of riparian rights, but that
any natural accretion of the shoreline may be considered.
The supreme court recognized evidence before the commissioner
that indicated man-made improvements altered the Carrs' shoreline.
As such, the supreme court concluded the trial court correctly
affirmed the commissioner's decision to use the Kennedy survey that
used the Historic MWL to determine the parties' riparian rights.
With respect to the Carrs' claim that the Kidds and Crowleys were
not granted riparian rights with their land, the supreme court
determined that an owner of riparian land has a right to water
frontage of such riparian land unless the grantor of the land on the
face of the granting deed manifestly retains those rights. The supreme
court held there was no evidence of any severance or retention of the
riparian rights to either the Kidd or the Crowley property in the chains
of title to both of their properties.
Megan Becher-Harris
WASHINGTON
Hsieh v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, No. 19126-5-H, 2001 Wash. App.
TEXIS 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001) (affirming dismissal of permit
holders' action, finding the statute of limitations and the doctrine of
laches barred declaratory relief, conversion, and injunction claims,
reversing the judgment awarding attorney fees, and finding the
mortgage was extinguished at the time of foreclosure and the permit
holders' action was not frivolous).
Jack and Dorothy Hsieh ("Hsiehs") had a water permit to
appropriate water from the Columbia River to irrigate their property.
Appellee, State of Washington Department of Ecology, established this
water permit initially when it issued the permit to the Esmieu Trust,
who later assigned the permit to the Hsiehs. In order to secure a loan,
the Hsiehs executed a mortgage to Appellee, John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. ("John Hancock"), on the property covered by the
water permit. In 1985, John Hancock foreclosed on the mortgage.
Appellees, J.R. Simplot Co. ("Simplot") and Iowa Beef Processors
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("IBP") then acquired the property. The Hsiehs claimed they still held
the water permit and sued John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP. The
Hsiehs challenged the lower court's grant of summary judgment
dismissal and award of attorney fees to John Hancock, Simplot, and
IBP. The first issue was whether the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of laches barred the Hsiehs' claims for (1) declaratory relief,
(2) a finding of conversion, and (3) an injunction. The second issue
addressed (1) whether the award of attorney fees was erroneous
because the mortgage was extinguished when the property was
foreclosed, and (2) whether the Hsiehs' action was frivolous.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
dismissing the Hsiehs' case, finding the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of laches barred their declaratory relief, conversion, and
injunction claims. The court reversed the judgment awarding attorney
fees, finding the Hsiehs' case was not frivolous and the mortgage
ended when the property was foreclosed.
The Hsiehs argued the court should award them a declaratory
judgment. The court found the statute of limitations barred this
action. The court stated parties must bring declaratory judgments
within a reasonable amount of time and the statute of limitations for
real property, including water permits, was ten years. Because the
Hsiehs waited eleven years, their claim was unreasonable, and, thus,
barred by the statute of limitations. The Hsiehs also argued the court
should make a finding of conversion. The court found the relevant
three-year statute of limitations barred this claim as well.
The Hsiehs also argued the appellate court should award an
injunction to prohibit John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP from
interfering with their water rights and to quiet title to their water
rights. The court found that because these claims were equitable
actions, they were subject to the defense of laches. Laches consists of
two elements: (1) inexcusable delay, and (2) prejudice to the other
party from the delay. The court determined the Hsiehs knew they
assigned their interest in the water permit to John Hancock, but waited
at least twelve years to bring this action. The court also determined
the Hsiehs' delay prejudiced John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP.
Moreover, John Hancock relied on the permit, which provided that
the water rights were appurtenant to the land. Finding both elements
of laches present, the court barred the Hsiehs from pursuing equitable
actions.
Finally, the Hsiehs argued the lower court erred by awarding
attorney fees to John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP. The court agreed
with the Hsiehs and found no basis for attorney fees existed based on
the terminated mortgage. In addition, the court found the lower
court awarded attorney fees under a statute, which permits awards of
attorney fees for frivolous actions. Here, the Hsiehs' claims were not
baseless. Thus, the reviewing court found the lower court erred in
awarding attorney fees.
Willow Morrow

